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The Everett (many-worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics faces a prima facie 
problem concerning quantum probabilities. Research in this area has been fast-paced over 
the last few years, following a controversial suggestion by David Deutsch that decision 
theory can solve the problem. This article provides a non-technical introduction to the 
decision-theoretic program, and a sketch of the current state of the debate. 
 
Full text: 
1 The problem of probability 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Quantum mechanics, as usually understood, is an indeterministic theory; it makes 
probabilistic predictions. For example: if one feeds into a Stern-Gerlach device an 
electron in a nontrivial superposition of spin-up and spin-down, ↓+↑= baψ , the 
'textbook' predictions are that the outcome will be either spin-up or spin-down, with 
probabilities given by |a|2,|b|2 respectively. 
 
The Everett, or many-worlds, interpretation gives a different account of quantum 
measurement. Indeterminism enters the 'textbook' story at the point of wavefunction 
collapse: when the measurement is performed, the wavefunction is supposed to collapse 
(indeterministically) into one or the other eigenstate of the observable being measured. 
But the many-worlds interpretation denies that collapse occurs. Instead, according to the 
many-worlds interpretation, when the measurement is performed, the apparatus, and the 
observer, and the laboratory, and indeed the entire world, will split into two copies, or 
'branches'. There will be one branch on which the spin-up outcome occurs (and a future 
copy of the observer records spin-up), and there will be another branch on which spin-
down occurs (and a future copy of the observer records spin-down). (For an accessible 
introduction to quantum mechanics and the measurement problem, see Albert (1992). For 
brief introductions to the many-worlds interpretation, see Vaidman (2002) and Barrett 
(2003).) 
 
The motivations for the many-worlds interpretation include (i) the fact that (if defensible) 
it solves the measurement problem, (ii) compatibility with the spirit of special relativity, 
and (iii) Ockham's razor. (The latter remark will be explained below.) But the 
interpretation has a prima facie problem in making sense of quantum probabilities, for the 
following reason: according to the many-worlds interpretation, all outcomes actually 
occur. That is: for each outcome that the textbooks would describe as 'possible', the 
many-worlds interpretation predicts that there will (certainly!) be some branch on which 
that outcome occurs. It is then difficult to see how one can make sense of assertions like 
'the probability of spin-up will be 2/3.' But neither does it seem acceptable just to throw 
out the probabilistic part of the theory: strip quantum mechanics of its quantitative 
probabilistic assertions, and one has neither a theory that will be any help in guiding 
expectations, nor a theory that can be subjected to empirical test. 
 
It will be useful to distinguish two aspects of the problem more sharply. We actually have 
two problems of probability: 
 
The incoherence problem: How can it make sense to talk of probabilities (other than 0 
and 1) at all, since all 'possible' outcomes actually occur? 
 
The quantitative problem: Insofar as it does make sense to talk of nontrivial 
probabilities for branches, how can the probabilities in a many-worlds interpretation 
agree with those of textbook quantum mechanics? 
 
1.2 A brief history 
 
Since the seminal (1957) paper by Hugh Everett III, 'the Everett interpretation' has been 
developed in many ways; correspondingly, many different approaches to Everettian 
probability have been investigated. It will be useful to review three of these, before 
turning to the interpretation favored by most modern-day 'Everettians'. 
 
Everett (1957). Everett noted that it will often be useful to talk about what happens on 
'most' branches1, and that such talk presupposes the existence of a preferred measure over 
the set of branches. Everett's proposal is that the measure one should use, for the purposes 
of such talk, is the "mod-squared measure", i.e. precisely the measure that agrees with the 
usual quantum-mechanical probabilities: 
 
Mod-squared measure: if ψ is a Hilbert space vector of unit norm, and aψ is a branch (a 
∈C), then the mod-squared measure of aψ is |a|2. 
 
However, nothing is said about the meaning of this measure (the incoherence problem). 
 
Deutsch (1985). David Deutsch suggests that, to solve the incoherence problem, the 
ontology of the many-worlds interpretation needs to be supplemented. In addition to the 
quantum state of the universe, we are to postulate a continuously infinite set of universes, 
together with a preferred measure on that set. The measure is such that, when a 
measurement occurs, the proportion of universes in the original branch that end up on a 
given branch is given by the mod-squared measure of that branch. Observers can then be 
uncertain about which outcome will occur in the universe they are in. 
 
Albert and Loewer (1988). David Albert and Barry Loewer explore the possibility of a 
'many minds' (as opposed to 'many worlds') interpretation of quantum mechanics. They 
postulate, not a continuous infinity of worlds, but a continuous infinity of minds 
associated with 'every sentient physical system, every observer' (ibid, p.206). Albert and 
Loewer then suggest that the time-evolution of an individual mind is probabilistic: for 
each mind of the observer preparing a Stern-Gerlach experiment, there is a chance of |a|2 
that that mind will end up in a state of seeming to have observed spin-up. Again, this 
solves the incoherence problem. 
 
(For a helpful summary of the history of Everettian probability, marginally less brief than 
the one I present here, see Saunders (1993), pp.134-6.) 
1.3 Many worlds via decoherence 
 
We have reviewed this history only for contrast; it is time now to the modern-day 'many-
worlds interpretation'. 
 
The idea here is to add nothing, at the level of fundamental ontology, to the quantum state 
of the universe ('universal wavefunction') – no continuous infinity of minds, and no 
worlds either. Instead, we have a 'two-level' proposal: 
 
Fundamental ontology: The quantum state of the universe is represented by a Hilbert 
space vector, ψ . 
 
Supervenience of the classical on the quantum: The way to relate the 'quasiclassical' 
worlds of familiar experience to the quantum-mechanical ontology is as follows:  
1. Decompose the quantum state into a set of (approximately) consistent histories, or, 
equivalently, expand the quantum state at each time as a superposition (in some 
basis). 
2. Identify quasiclassical worlds with individual histories, or, equivalently, 
individual elements of the expansion. 
Step (2) has the consequence that, after the Stern-Gerlach experiment, it is not the case 
that we have a world in which the apparatus is in an (improper) mixed state of pointing to 
'up' and pointing to 'down'. Rather, we have two worlds, in each of which the pointer is in 
a definite state, either of pointing to 'up', or of pointing to 'down'. This is how the many-
worlds interpretation reconciles our experience (specifically: the fact that we never see 
pointers in mixed states of pointing to the left and pointing to the right) on the one hand, 
with the absence of collapse on the other. 
 
In defense of this 'two-level' proposal, we note that the key idea is one that is already 
present in classical physics: at the level of fundamental ontology in classical physics, 
there are no tables – there are only particles – but still there is a perfectly good sense in 
which tables 'emerge', or count as objects at a higher level of description, in a classical-
mechanical universe. 
 
The interpretive program sketched above, however, faces a preferred basis problem: in 
virtue of what is one set of (approximately consistent) histories, or one basis for 
expansion, any better than the others? The modern-day many-worlds theorist appeals, at 
this point, to the theory of decoherence. The idea here is to argue along the following 
lines: given the sorts of Hamiltonians that are realized in the actual world, we expect one 
(approximately defined) basis to be ‘preferred’ in the sense that only when the universal 
state is expanded in that basis will it be possible for stable higher-level structures (such as 
tables and human beings) to emerge within individual elements of the superposition. It 
remains formally possible to expand the universal state in a basis that differs significantly 
from the decoherence-preferred basis, but there will be no non-gerrymandered objects 
localized in elements of such a purely formal expansion; in particular, since we are non-
gerrymandered objects, there is no puzzle about why we experience only objects that are 
approximately localized relative to the decoherence-preferred basis. (The technical details 
of the theory of decoherence, and the arguments concerning precisely how these details 
are supposed to solve the preferred basis problem, are somewhat involved: see, e.g., 
Wallace (2002, 2003a) and references therein.) 
 
The decoherence-based many-worlds interpretation enjoys significant advantages over 
earlier Everett-style interpretations. Objections to Deutsch's 'many-worlds' and Albert and 
Loewer's 'many-minds' proposals include charges of ontological extravagance (all these 
worlds/all these minds!), vagueness (where are the axioms specifying the basis in which 
'splitting' occurs? (Kent 1990)), and, in the case of the many-minds interpretation, mind-
body dualism. All of these charges evaporate once one moves to the decoherence-based 
approach. There is no 'ontological extravagance' in any offensive sense, since nothing is 
being added at the fundamental level. (Indeed, the fundamental ontology of this sort of 
many-worlds interpretation is actually more parsimonious than that of the rival 'hidden-
variables' approaches; cf. the remark about Ockham's razor in section 1.1.) Vagueness is 
acceptable since the 'many worlds' appear at the emergent level rather than the 
fundamental level, and supervenience relations are always vague. 'Minds' play no special 
role in the theory, so dualism is not required. 
 
All of this is great progress. But it comes at a price: in the move from Deutsch's or Albert 
and Loewer's proposals to the decoherence-based approach, the problem of probability 
has returned. We have an (emergent) account of worlds 'splitting' in the future direction 
of time, each outcome will occur (on some branch), and there doesn't seem to be anything 
that the probabilities can be probabilities of.  
2 The Everettian Representation Theorem 
The problem of probability in the (decoherence-based) many-worlds interpretation 
seemed utterly intractable until David Deutsch (1999) suggested understanding 
probability in terms of rational action. Specifically, Deutsch claimed to 'prove', via 
decision theory, that the 'rational' agent who believes she lives in an Everettian multiverse 
will nevertheless 'make decisions as if' the mod-squared measure gave chances for 
outcomes. 
 
This claim is highly controversial, and continues to receive a significant amount of 
attention in the philosophy of physics literature. Advocates claim that Deutsch's proposal 
removes the last obstacle to accepting a many-worlds interpretation; critics contend either 
that the decision-theoretic result is unsound, or that it is insufficient to give the Everettian 
everything she needs from 'quantum probability'.2 In this section, we sketch the spirit of 
decision theory in general, and Deutsch's proposal in particular. 
 
Decision theory (Savage). Decision theory is a theory designed for the analysis of 
rational decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. One considers an agent who is 
uncertain what the state of the world is: for example, she is uncertain whether or not it 
will rain later today. The agent faces a choice of acts: for example, she is going for a 
walk, and she has to decide whether or not to take an umbrella. She knows, for each 
possible state of the world and each possible act, what will be the consequence if the state 
in question obtains and the act in question is performed: for example, she knows that, if 
she elects not to take the umbrella and it rains, she will get wet. The agent is therefore 
able to describe each of her candidate acts as a function from the set of possible States to 
the set of Consequences.3 
 
Decision theory then places a set of rationality constraints over the set of Acts. For 
example, the preferences of a rational agent must be transitive: if an agent prefers act A to 
act B, and prefers act B to act C, then the same agent must prefer act A to act C. Less 
trivially, we require the agent's preferences to satisfy, for example, an axiom of 
Dominance: roughly, that if act A and act B give the same consequence on some subset of 
possible states, and act A results in better consequences than act B on the remaining 
subset ('better' according to the agent's own preferences),  then the rational agent prefers 
A to B. 
 
The decision theorist then proves a representation theorem: it can be shown that, for any 
agent whose preferences over acts satisfy the given rationality constraints, there exists a 
unique probability measure p on the set of States, and a utility function U on the set of 
Consequences (unique up to positive linear transformation), such that, for any two acts A, 
B, the agent prefers A to B iff the expected utility of A is greater than that of B. Here, the 
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This result guarantees an operational role for subjective probability: any rational agent 
will (at least) act as if she is maximizing expected utility with respect to some probability 
measure. 
 
Everettian application of decision theory (Deutsch). Deutsch's idea was to apply a 
similar approach to the case of a rational agent choosing among quantum games (or 
quantum bets). The conceptual side of Savage's decision theory must be adjusted slightly: 
• 'States': To specify a quantum bet, we consider, not the set of possible states of the 
world, but the set of future branches that will (certainly!) result from a given 
quantum measurement, on the assumption that Everettian quantum mechanics is 
true. For example, if an Everettian agent knows that a Stern-Gerlach experiment is 
to be performed on an electron initially in a superposition ↓+↑= baψ , then 
she knows that after the measurement, there will be one branch (of weight |a|2) on 
which spin-up (↑) occurs, and one branch (of weight |b|2) on which spin-down (↓) 
occurs. The set of states would then be given by {↑,↓}. 
• 'Consequences': Naive application of Savage's theory to a case of Everettian 
branching might suggest that the 'Consequence' of an action is the entire 
branching structure to the future of the decision. Crucially, this is not the route 
taken by Deutsch's approach: instead, we identify the 'Consequences' of decision 
theory with things that happen to individual future copies of the agent, on 
particular branches. 
• 'Acts': An act is still a function from States to Consequences. Here, corresponding 
to our identifications of States with branches and Consequences with rewards-on-
branches, this means: an act is an assignment of rewards to branches. For example, 
if the agent pays $1 to enter an agreement on which she receives $3 on the spin-up 








We further introduce the notions of a chance setup and a quantum game: 
• ‘Chance setup’: A chance setup is a pair X),ψ , where ψ  is the quantum state 
of the object system to be measured, and X
)
 is the hermitian operator representing 
the physical property to be measured. (So: a chance setup generates a set of 
branches, together with a natural measure on that set, given by the mod-squared 
rule. For example, if ψ  is the spin superposition ↓+↑≡ baψ  and X)  is the 






, then the chance setup will 
generate a set containing a spin-up branch of natural measure 2a , and a spin-
down branch of natural measure 2b .) 
• ‘Quantum game’ or ‘quantum bet’: A quantum game consists of a chance setup, 
together with an act or ‘payoff function’ P associating a Consequence with each 
eigenvalue of the operator X
)
 (i.e., with each future branch). A quantum game is 
therefore specified by a triple PX ,,
)ψ . 
 
By imposing a set of rationality constraints on agents' preferences among such quantum 
games, Deutsch is able to prove a representation theorem that is analogous in many 
respects to Savage's: the preferences of a rational agent are representable by a probability 
measure over the set of States (branches) for every possible chance setup, and a utility 
function on the set of Consequences (rewards-on-branches), such that, for any two 
Everettian acts A, B, the agent prefers A to B iff EU(A)>EU(B). (Expected utility is 
defined via the same formal expression as above.) This result, if sound, seems (perhaps) 
to solve the incoherence problem: the rational Everettian agent acts as if she regarded her 
multiple future branches as multiple possible futures. 
 
There is, however, a further, quantitative feature of Deutsch's result that has no analog in 
Savage's representation theorem. For Savage, two ideally rational agents may be 
represented by different probability measures on the set of States. (For any given agent, 
the probability measure is uniquely fixed by that agent's preferences. But two rational 
agents may have different sets of preferences, each consistent with the rationality 
constraints.) This freedom to disagree is not permitted by Deutsch's result: according to 
the latter, once the chance setup is specified (so that the set of branches and the mod-
squared measure of each future branch have been fixed), the probability measure over 
that set of branches that represents the preferences of any rational agent must be the 
mod-squared measure. Call this result the Everettian Representation Theorem (ERT). 
 
Deutsch suggests that this result captures, within the Everett interpretation, everything 
that is important about quantum probability: 
  
"I shall prove that [the rational agent] necessarily makes decisions as if [the 
assertion that the mod-squared measure gives probabilities] were true. I take this 
to be the effective meaning of [that assertion]." (Deutsch (1999), p.2) 
3 Problems with the decision-theoretic approach 
This result strikes many people as a 'rabbit out of a hat' trick – how did it happen, and 
how can it be right? There are three (prima facie) reasons to be suspicious of the 
Everettian Representation Theorem: 
 
1. Decision theory is supposed to apply to decision-making under uncertainty. How, 
then, can its application to deterministic branching, in which the agent is certain 
that all 'possible' outcomes will actually occur, be justified? 
2. As noted above, decision theory does not usually fix a unique probability measure 
over the set of States; it is usually possible for two ideally rational agents to have 
different probability measures. To obtain this feature in the Everettian case, 
Deutsch and Wallace must therefore be adding some axioms that have no analogs 
in Savage's theory. How can these additional axioms be justified? 
3. The decision-theoretic result, even if sound, guarantees only that a rational agent 
who believes the Everett interpretation will act as if the Everettian branch weights 
are probabilities. Is this really all we need from quantum probability? 
 
We will discuss each of these in turn. 
3.1 Justifying the application of decision theory 
 
Let us elaborate on our first problem. In conventional applications of decision theory, one 
starts from the assumption that the agent is uncertain which State obtains; one then 
applies the theory, and concludes that (if the agent is rational, then) this uncertainty is 
quantifiable by some probability measure. It is then (relatively) clear how the probability 
measure is to be interpreted: the probability measure gives the agent's degrees of belief, 
for each subset of S, that some state in that subset obtains. 
 
The problem is that, at first sight, none of this seems to make sense in Deutsch's 
application of decision theory to Everettian branching. The agent (it seems) is not 
'uncertain which outcome will occur'; she knows that all outcomes will occur. 
Correspondingly, even if (as seems implausible, in the absence of the appropriate 
interpretation) we could find some reason for crediting Deutsch's axioms with the status 
of 'rationality constraints', it is unclear what the resulting probability measure could mean. 
It cannot be quantifying the agent's degrees of belief in the corresponding outcomes, 
since all such degrees of belief are 1; how, then, could we understand the prescription to 
maximize 'expected utility' with respect to such a measure? 
 
3.1.1 The 'subjective uncertainty' (SU) program 
 
The response of the 'subjective uncertainty' (SU) program is to assert that, contrary 
(perhaps) to initial appearances, the set of future branches in a 'deterministic' branching 
situation is a locus of uncertainty for the agent. The agent performing a Stern-Gerlach 
measurement, for example, knows that (in some sense) all branches will be physically 
real, but still (in another sense) is uncertain about whether the result of the experiment 
will be spin-up or spin-down. 
 
There are two ways of fleshing out this proposal: 
 
• Subjective-uncertainty (splitting). There is one world before the measurement is 
performed, and this splits into two copies when the measurement occurs. (In the 
language of the 'consistent histories' formalism: a world, at a given time, is 
represented by a projector associated with that time.) However, when a world at a 
given time has multiple futures, with different things happening in different 
futures, there is no fact of the matter about what will happen in 'the' future of the 
world in question. In our example, it is not true that spin-up will occur, and it is 
not true that spin-down will occur. Our agent knows this: so, she does not believe 
that spin-up will occur, and she does not believe that spin-down will occur. 
However, she does believe that spin-up-or-spin-down will occur: this occurs on 
every branch to her future, and she knows that. She is uncertain as to whether the 
result will be spin-up or spin-down. (This proposal is much in the spirit of the 
Aristotelian attitude to future contingents: "there will be a sea-battle tomorrow" is 
neither true nor false, yet I am uncertain as to whether there will be a sea-battle 
tomorrow.) 
 
• Subjective-uncertainty (divergence). There are two worlds all along: a world is 
a maximal sequence of macroscopically distinct world-stages. (In consistent 
histories language: a world is represented by a history, i.e. a time-ordered 
sequence of projections, extending both into past and future.) In particular, there 
are two copies of our agent all along, even before the measurement. However, 
while those agents both know all of the above, they both have self-locating 
ignorance: neither of them knows which of the two agents she is. Each of them, 
that is, is uncertain as to whether she is the copy in the spin-up world, or the copy 
in the spin-down world. It follows, of course, that each of them is uncertain about 
whether it is spin-up or spin-down that will occur (in the world she is in). 
 
For further discussion of precisely how the subjective-uncertainty proposal might be 
filled out, see Wallace (2005c). 
 
If (either version of) the subjective-uncertainty thesis is true, then our first problem 
dissolves: decision theory applies to cases of uncertainty, Everettian branching is a case 
of uncertainty, and so decision theory applies to Everettian branching. 
3.1.2 Justification without subjective uncertainty 
 
This quick response only works, however, if (some version of) the subjective-uncertainty 
thesis is true. Two points should be noted: 
• The subjective-uncertainty thesis is highly controversial. (For objections, see 
Greaves 2004 and Lewis 2006. For a helpful review of most of the debate over 
SU, see Wallace (2005b, secs. 3.3-3.5). For a more extended exposition of 
Wallace's own argument for SU, see Wallace (2005c).) 
• Some of the Everettian claims (specifically: the claim that a better account of 
probability can be provided on the Everett interpretation than on other 
interpretations; see sections 3.2 and 4.2 below) rely crucially on the differences 
between a branching universe and a non-branching one. These differences are 
obliterated by the language of subjective-uncertainty. It therefore seems that, even 
if the SU thesis is correct, any claim that Everettian probability is in a better state 
than non-Everettian probability must rely on the fact (if it is a fact) that the 
decision-theoretic approach can be justified independently of SU. 
We must therefore ask whether or not the decision-theoretic approach can be justified 
without appealing to subjective-uncertainty. 
 
The issue is whether or not our usual reasons for accepting the decision-theoretic axioms, 
in cases of uncertainty, have equally compelling analogs in the branching case. So we 
must try to identify exactly what those reasons are. Consider, for example the Dominance 
axiom alluded to above. Recall: This says, roughly, that if act A and act B give the same 
consequence on some subset ( SS ⊂1 , say) of possible states, and act A results in better 
consequences than act B on the remaining subset 11 SSS −=  ('better' according to the 
agent's own preferences),  then the rational agent prefers A to B. 
 
Why does rationality require conforming to Dominance, when the set of States is a locus 
of uncertainty? Well: it is difficult to 'justify' such obvious truths, but one might reason as 
follows. Either the actual state s is in S1, or s is in 1S . In the former case I get the same 
reward regardless of which act I perform; in the latter case I will do better if I choose act 
A than if I choose act B. So, in choosing A over B, I will not lose, and I might gain. 
 
Suppose now that the set of States is interpreted, not as a locus of uncertainty, but as a set 
of coexisting branches. Then an exactly parallel justification for Dominance can be given, 
as follows. The world of which I am now a part has multiple futures, given by the 
elements of S. In some of these (viz. those in 1S ), I get the same reward regardless of 
which act I perform. In others (viz. those in 1S ), I do better if I chose act A than if I chose 
act B. So, in choosing A over B, I will not lose on any branch, and I will gain on some 
branches. 
 
Is the justification of Dominance more compelling, or in any other important sense better, 
in the uncertainty case than in the branching case? As far as I can see, the answer is 'no'; 
in that case, the decision theory required for the ERT is just as well-justified without 
subjective-uncertainty as with. The result is that, even if she does not regard the future as 
uncertain, the rational Everettian agent maximizes expected utility with respect to some 
probability measure over branches. 
 
It does not, of course, make sense to call this measure a measure of the agent's 
uncertainty if we are rejecting subjective-uncertainty, so, talk of 'degrees of belief' seems 
inappropriate. We might instead call it the agent's 'caring measure', since the measure 
quantifies the extent to which (for decision-making purposes) the agent cares about what 
happens on any given branch. (This proposal is advocated by Greaves (2004); a similar 
suggestion is made by Vaidman (2002).) 
3.2 Justifying the additional axioms 
3.2.1 Measurement Neutrality (MN) and Equivalence 
Suppose, then, that (with or without subjective uncertainty) we accept the applicability in 
principle of decision theory to cases of deterministic branching. Then it is unsurprising 
that the rational agent maximizes expected utility with respect to some measure over 
branches (interpreted either as a measure of the agent's degree of belief that any given 
branch will be actual, or as a measure of the degree to which the agent cares about which 
reward is received on any given branch). But how can we force the measure in question 
to be the mod-squared one, where Savage's decision theory achieves no such thing? 
 
This extra feature of the ERT can be traced to the assumption of 'Measurement 
Neutrality' (or, equivalently, 'Equivalence').4 These assumptions are as follows: 
 
Measurement Neutrality: 
A rational agent is indifferent between any two quantum bets that agree on the state ψ  
on which the measurement is to be performed, the observable X
)
 to be measured, and the 
'payoff function' P  from the spectrum of X
)
 to the set of consequences. 
 
Equivalence: 
A rational agent is indifferent between any two quantum bets that agree, for each possible 
reward, on the mod-squared measure of branches on which that reward is given. 
 
For a (highly illuminating) proof that MN implies Equivalence, see Wallace (2005a, 
section 7). The converse is a trivial consequence of quantum mechanics. (Two 
measurements of the same quantity X
)
 on the same initial state ψ  generate the same set 
of branches and the same mod-squared measure on that set, regardless of the details of 
the measurement process; if the agent is indifferent between any two bets that agree on 
the total mod-squared measure of each reward, she is, in particular, indifferent between 
any two bets that agree on the total mod-squared measure of each reward and further 
agree on the chance setup X
)
,ψ  that led to the branching event and the reward 
assignment.) 
3.2.2 What MN/Equivalence rules out 
 
The clearest way to assess the plausibility (or otherwise) of these axioms is to consider, 
by way of a few examples, what they rule out. 
 
Here are some decision-making strategies that conform to the 'maximize expected utility' 
injunction (and so satisfy the Everettian analogs of the usual Savage axioms), but that 
employ a probability measure other than the mod-squared measure (and violate 
Measurement Neutrality/Equivalence): 
 
• Naive Counting: All branches are to be assigned equal measure. 
• Eigenvalue Relevance: The measure is given by assigning, to each branch, the 
absolute value of the measurement eigenvalue corresponding to the branch in 
question (and renormalizing). (So, for example: I should always 'have degree of 
belief zero that the outcome will be eigenvalue 0', or I should always 'have caring 
measure zero for any eigenvalue-0 branches'.) 
• Relevance of Socks: The measure of a given branch is to be set to zero if the 
agent possesses an odd number of socks on that branch 10 minutes after the 
measurement; otherwise the mod-squared measure is to be used (and the resulting 
measure renormalized). (So: if, for example, I am almost certain that on the spin-
up branch all but one of my socks will be burnt 5 minutes after the measurement, 
I should 'be almost certain that spin-up will not occur', or I should 'care next to 
nothing about the spin-up branch'.) 
 
Here is a fourth possibility, of a different character. Rather than attempting to specify 
some particular alternative measure, we simply assert 
 
• Full permissivism: Any probability measure on the set of possible branches is 
rational. 
3.2.3 Assessing MN/Equivalence 
 
The question is then: do the above MN/Equivalence-violating policies count as rationally 
permissible (and hence as counterexamples to the claim that MN/Equivalence is a 
rationality constraint), or can they be ruled out as irrational (and MN/Equivalence 
upheld)? 
 
Let us put full permissivism aside for the moment. (I return to it in passing in the last 
three paragraphs of this subsection; cf. also section 4.1.) Let us address each of our three 
specific putative counterexamples in turn; there are interesting differences between the 
three. 
 
Consider, first, Eigenvalue Relevance. It is not too difficult to see that this policy is 
actually incoherent: it would have the agent's preferences between quantum games turn 
on arbitrary features of particular descriptions of those games, rather than physical 
features of the games themselves. Any measurement of an operator iiaX
i
i∑=)  is 
equally a measurement of any other operator of the form iibX
i
i∑=') ; there is no fact 
of the matter as to whether 'the eigenvalue' attached to the branch i  is given by ai or bi; 
the eigenvalues are mere arbitrary labels. 
 
Naive Counting is incoherent too, but for subtler reasons.5 Here it is essential that by 
'many-worlds interpretation' we mean the decoherence-based MWI, not an old-style 
MWI in which worlds are added to the formalism as an additional ontological primitive. 
(In the latter, naive counting would be coherent if, contra Deutsch's own (1985) proposal, 
we postulated a finite number of 'worlds'.) 
 
Why does naive counting break down in the decoherence approach? The core of the 
problem is that naive counting, too, presupposes the existence of a piece of structure that 
is not in fact present in the theory. We can truly describe (e.g.) the situation after a Stern-
Gerlach experiment as one in which there are 'two' branches, and for many purposes it 
will be useful to do so, but there is no more going on here than when one (truly) says 
"There are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subsets of the real line: ( )0,∞−  
and [ )+∞,0 ." In both cases, there are arbitrarily many alternative descriptions that are 
equally true. It is therefore a condition of adequacy on any suggested measure that the 
suggestion be invariant under such redescriptions; the naive counting measure fails to 
meet this condition. (To put this point another way: to insist on 'naïve counting' is to 
apply a Principle of Indifference in a way that leads to paradox.) 
 
Let us elaborate slightly on the preceding paragraph. What we really have (at the 
quantum level of description) is the quantum state of the universe. We decompose this 
into a set of branches, for the purposes of relating the quasiclassical level of description 
to the quantum level of description. But the criteria of adequacy of the decomposition (cf. 
section 1.3) allow for a certain amount of vagueness as to which is the 'right' set of 
histories. In particular: 
• The history space can be coarse-grained and fine-grained, without losing 
decoherence. There is no fact of the matter as to which level of coarse-graining 
'really' carves the quantum state at the world-joints. But coarse-graining and fine-
graining can drastically alter the naive counting measure. 
• The decoherence basis can be rotated slightly in Hilbert space, without losing 
(approximate) decoherence. There is no fact of the matter as to exactly which 
basis 'really' matches the world-joints. But such slight rotations can drastically 
alter the naive counting measure. 
This point is of crucial importance, and often insufficiently appreciated; it rules out the 
vast majority of suggested 'counterexamples' to the Born rule in the Everettian context. 
(For further explanation and discussion, see Wallace (2005a, p.21) and/or Greaves (2004, 
sec. 5.3.) 
 
It might be objected that these objections to Eigenvalue Relevance and Naïve Counting 
show only that the policies are as yet underspecified; we could complete them, on a case-
by-case basis, by stipulating that on this occasion we intend to use that set of 
eigenvalues/that decomposition into branches for the purposes of defining our subjective 
probability measure, and note that we have thereby violated MN/Equivalence without 
implicitly committing ourselves to any contradictions. This is perfectly correct, 
technically speaking. However, insofar as Eigenvalue Relevance and Naive Counting 
were supposed to be any advance on general permissivism, the objection is beside the 
point. It was always known that, for any branching multiverse, there formally exist 
measures other than the mod-squared measure over the set of branches. The potential 
interest of Eigenvalue Relevance and Naïve Counting lay in the claim that there exist 
alternative measures that are (i) reasonably natural, and (ii) simply specifiable. The 
underspecification problem disposes of this claim. (The lingering optimist is invited to try 
completing the specification!) 
 
What of Relevance of Socks? Well, plausible or otherwise, there is nothing incoherent 
about this policy. The policy's use of the mod-squared measure (as opposed to any 
implicit reliance on counting) ensures that it is appropriately robust under relabelings of 
branches, coarse-and fine-graining of the history space, rotations of the decoherence basis, 
etc. 
 
One might object that Relevance of Socks is crazy. This is correct, but it is far from clear 
that that can be taken as an objection in the present context: according to the weak notion 
of 'rationality' with which decision theory usually deals, the agent is permitted to have an 
arbitrarily 'crazy' utility function, so why not a 'crazy' probability measure, too? 
  
To answer this question would require examination of the positive arguments that can be 
offered in defense of Equivalence. A review of these is outside the scope of this article. 
(For defense of MN and/or Equivalence, see, e.g., Wallace (2005a, secs.7-8), Saunders 
(2004, sec.5.3).) 
 
For the sake of argument, though, suppose that the arguments in question are 
unpersuasive. Then we cannot convince an agent who is determined to set his degrees of 
belief/'caring measure' according to Relevance of Socks that such a course of action is 
irrational. But how bad is that? We cannot convince an agent who is certain that she is 
being spied upon by aliens that such belief is irrational, either; this does not prevent the 
rest of us from considering ourselves more rational than she, or from acting on our own 
beliefs. 
 
The right attitude seems to be the following. Given that the actual physical state of the 
universe is the physical state, the measure given by using the mod-squared prediction in 
conjunction with that state is overwhelmingly more natural than the measure given by 
Relevance of Socks (why socks, rather than pants?), or any of the arbitrarily complicated 
measures allowed by full permissivism. This makes acceptance of the Born rule more 
rational than acceptance of any rival branch measure. (We had better not spurn such 
'naturalness' requirements: without them, decision theory is trivialized.) So something can 
be said in favor of the mod-squared measure. It is true that we cannot win over a really 
die-hard advocate of Relevance of Socks; but this does not prevent the rest of us from 
considering ourselves more rational than he, and acting according to the measure we 
ourselves accept. Furthermore, for agents (like the author and, I hope, the reader) who do 
accept the mod-squared measure in both non-Everettian and Everettian contexts, the 
choice between an Everettian and a non-Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 
will not affect everyday decisions. 
3.3 Is decision-theoretic probability enough? 
We turn to our third problem for the decision-theoretic approach to Everettian probability: 
even if it is true that a rational Everettian agent maximizes expected utility with respect 
to the mod-squared measure over branches, is this enough to give us everything we need 
from Everettian probability? 
 
Here is a reason to think it might not be enough. One role that 'physical probability' is 
supposed to play is, indeed, the practical role captured by decision theory: if one believes 
a theory that assigns high probability to X, then one has high degree of belief that X will 
happen, and one acts accordingly. But there is also a second, epistemic, role: a theory's 
assignment of probabilities to possible outcomes is intimately involved in the process of 
theory confirmation. We normally consider a theory to be empirically confirmed if we 
have observed results that the theory in question would have predicted with high chance; 
Everettian quantum mechanics would have predicted the results we have in fact observed 
with high 'branch weight'; it is not immediately obvious that this is good enough. One 
might worry, therefore, that while the decision-theoretic result establishes how one 
should act if one has (somehow!) come to believe that Everettian quantum mechanics is 
true, it says nothing about whether or not one should believe that Everettian quantum 
mechanics is true. Call this the 'epistemic problem' for Everettian quantum mechanics. 
 
Conditional on the assumption that the subjective-uncertainty program is viable, the 
worry that Everettian probability might play the practical role that 'physical probability' 
normally plays, while not also playing the epistemic role, is rather far-fetched. According 
to subjective-uncertainty, there is no relevant difference between the Everett 
interpretation and any other probabilistic theory: both sorts of theory give us a set of 
physically possible futures, and give the rational subjective likelihoods of each 
possibility's being actual. It is then extremely hard to see how the link between the 
practical and epistemic roles of probability – whatever exactly that link is! – can hold in 
non-Everettian cases, while not also holding in the Everettian case. 
 
If the subjective-uncertainty program is rejected, however, this quick response is not 
available. It does not follow, of course, that the epistemic problem cannot be solved 
without subjective-uncertainty; what follows is that further argument is required. (See 
Wallace (2005b), sec. 4.2, for a suggestion that the prospects look bleak; see Greaves 
(2007) for an attempt to provide the required further argument.) 
4 The goalposts 
4.1 Many worlds are no worse than one 
In a theory that postulates non-branching universes (e.g., in the quantum context, a 
stochastic collapse or hidden-variable theory), the treatment of objective probability has 
the following structure: 
 
1. The theory postulates a set of possible histories. 
2. The theory places a measure on that set, and calls the measure 'chance'. 
3. Rational agents accept the Principal Principle: roughly, that their degree of belief 
in a given event, conditional on the truth of the theory in question, is to be equal 
to the chance assigned by that theory to that event. 
 
In discussions of the allegedly 'problematic' status of Everettian probability, it has been 
repeatedly pointed out6 that there is in any case no substantive justification for the 
Principal Principle: the principle is accepted as a primitive principle of rationality. It 
follows that, if we are not to set the bar higher for Everettian quantum mechanics than we 
normally do for non-branching-universe theories, we should not reject the Everett 
interpretation merely because nothing substantive can be said about the quantitative 
problem of probability (if indeed that is the case). Once we have a solution to the 
incoherence problem – so, either we accept ('subjective-uncertainty') that it makes sense 
for an Everettian agent to have non-trivial degrees of belief about future measurement 
outcomes, or we accept the idea of a 'caring measure' over branches, with respect to 
which the agent maximizes 'expected' utility – we should, if we are content with non-
Everettian theories, be content with the following:7 
 
4. The theory postulates a set of histories (all of which are supposed physically real). 
5. The theory places a measure on that set, and calls the measure 'branch weight'. 
6. Rational agents accept a branching-universe version of the Principal Principle: 
roughly, that their degree of belief (or 'caring measure') for a given set of branches, 
conditional on the truth of the theory in question, is to be equal to the branch 
weights assigned by that theory to that event. 
 
The whole Everettian decision-theoretic enterprise – once we have a solution to the 
incoherence problem (i.e. once we have accepted that rational agents must have some 
credence distribution or 'caring measure' over branches) – is actually an attempt to go 
beyond this minimal solution to the quantitative problem. It is an attempt to provide a 
substantive justification of the 'Everettian Principal Principle', and thus to exceed the 
achievements of non-branching accounts of objective probability. 
4.2 Are many worlds better than one? 
The 'many worlds are no worse than one' claim of section 4.1 is relatively uncontroversial 
(although the emphasis is intended seriously!). Some authors, however, make a stronger 
claim: that Everettian QM (post-ERT) actually provides a more satisfactory treatment of 
objective probability than has been possible on the basis of any other physical theory. 
Thus, for example8, Saunders writes: 
 
"It is ironic that the interpretation of probability in the Everett interpretation has 
always been thought to be its weakest link. On the contrary, it seems that it is one 
of the strongest points in its favour." (Saunders 2004, p.26) 
 
Whether or not this is correct depends on the extent to which the additional axioms – the 
axioms that enable Deutsch and Wallace to establish the uniqueness of the mod-squared 
measure as the rational 'uncertainty' or 'caring' measure, where Savage could only 
establish the existence of some probability measure for any given rational agent – have 
more force in a branching-multiverse situation than in a parallel-worlds situation. This is 
an open question (cf. section 3.2 above). 
5 Many worlds and Sleeping Beauty 
I conclude with some brief remarks on another open problem, whose solution may offer 
significant illumination. 
 
When one finds uncertainty in an Everettian context, it is often of the self-locating variety.  
For example, according to one version of the subjective-uncertainty program, the pre-
measurement agent is unsure which world she is in – but 'world' here does not mean 
'everything that is physically real', and both worlds exist in the same possible multiverse. 
Less contentiously, with or without subjective-uncertainty, an Everettian agent after a 
measurement is often in a situation of self-locating uncertainty: if she has not yet looked 
at the measuring apparatus, then she does not know which branch she is in. 
 
This suggests the possibility of analogies between the Everettian case and a puzzle 
surrounding the notion of self-locating belief more generally: the Sleeping Beauty 
problem (Elga (2000), Lewis (2000)). Exploration of possible analogies may shed light 
on both Everettian epistemology and the nature of rational de se belief in general. For 
example, Peter Lewis (2006) sketches and advocates a particular way in which the 
Everettian and Sleeping Beauty cases might be regarded as analogous, and argues that, 
pending explication of any relevant disanalogy, "the dominant ‘thirder’ solution to the 
Sleeping Beauty paradox [is] incompatible with the tenability of the many-worlds 
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1 Everett writes of a 'relative state interpretation' rather than a 'many-worlds interpretation'; correspondingly, 
we writes of 'almost all observer states' rather than 'almost all branches'. 
2 A brief history of the early part of this discussion is as follows. The original suggestion was made by 
Deutsch (1999). Deutsch's argument was criticized by Barnum, Caves, Finkelstein, Fuchs and Schack 
(2000). Wallace (2003b) gave a particularly clear reconstruction of Deutsch's argument, and argued that 
(pace Barnum et al) it can be seen to be sound after all, once one recognizes two crucial premises that 
Deutsch himself had left implicit: the Everett interpretation itself, and 'Measurement Neutrality'. Wallace 
(2005a) presents a simpler form of the argument, using weaker decision-theoretic axioms. Either of these 
papers by Wallace provides a good entry point into the literature. (Wallace's (2003b) is illuminating, but 
perhaps requires greater familiarity with the quantum formalism than does his (2005a).) 
3 This is the decision-theoretic framework developed by Savage (1972). An alternative framework is 
proposed by Jeffrey (1965). It would be interesting to explore the application of the Jeffrey framework to 
the Everettian argument. 
4 I skirt over a large amount of technical detail here. Deutsch's and Wallace's proofs do not, in fact, proceed 
by first citing the usual Savage proof, and then adding an assumption of Measurement 
Neutrality/Equivalence to restrict the permissible probability measures; rather, that 'extra' assumption is 
built in right from the beginning. (It is actually encoded in the notation: Wallace and Deutsch write, e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ρ,, X)ψ  for a quantum bet, and this notation would be an insufficient specification of the bet if 
MN/Equivalence was not assumed.) The reader who wishes to pursue the details of the proofs is directed to 
the excellent papers by Wallace, cited above. 
5 Historically, the thought that the 'naive counting measure' is not only a possible alternative to the mod-
squared measure, but is actually the unique rational measure for an Everettian, has been a major source of 
objections to Everettian solutions to the quantitative problem. Cf. Neill Graham's remark: 
"It is extremely difficult to see what significance [the mod-squared] measure can have when its predictions 
are completely contradicted by a simple count of the worlds involved, worlds that Everett's own work 
assures us must be on an equal footing." (Graham 1973, p.236) 
Even if the naive counting measure were coherent, though, the objection would remain a curious one: it 
presupposes a dubious application of the principle of indifference (and might just as well be levelled 
against a single-universe collapse interpretation, in which all outcomes are 'equally possible'). 
6 See, e.g. Papineau (1996), Lewis (2004). (Papineau structures the case in terms of a 'decision-theoretic 
link' between probabilities and rational action, and an 'inferential link' between probabilities and 
frequencies, rather than directly in terms of the Principal Principle.) 
7 This way of setting out the analogy is due to Wayne Myrvold (in correspondence). 
8 Cf. also Papineau (2004, secs. IIC,D); Wallace (2005b, sec.3.6). 
